

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 167607  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY AF/W:TWMSMITH:BA  
APPROVED BY P-MR. HABIB  
EUR/WE-JVSMITH  
AF-RMMOOSE  
EUR/CE-SKLINGAMAN  
EUR/NE-CSCHALLER  
NEA-SSOBER  
S/S-O:AWOTTO

-----108016 190140Z /70

O 190036Z JUL 77  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 167607

EXDIS FOR THE AMBASSADOR;

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, CD, US

SUBJECT: MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CHAD  
CONFIDENTIAL

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REFS: A) STATE 116492, B) BONN 11765, C) BRUSSELS 8224,  
D) PARIS 20708, E) STATE 166037

1. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD TAKE FIRST AVAILABLE OPPOR-  
TUNITY TO RAISE AT HIGH LEVEL IN HOST GOVERNMENT OUR CON-  
CERN REGARDING THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CHAD AND OUR  
DESIRE TO FIND WAYS TO STRENGTHEN CHAD'S ABILITY TO DEAL  
WITH THE SITUATION. FOR PARIS - YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO  
RAISE THIS WITH QUAI POLITICAL DIRECTOR LABOULAYE, JULY 19.  
FOR BONN - YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO RAISE THIS AT LUNCH WITH

FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, JULY 19. FOR BRUSSELS - YOU SHOULD FIND EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE THESE POINTS.

2. YOU SHOULD DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING IN MAKING YOUR APPROACH.

A) CHADIAN VICE PRESIDENT DJIME ARRIVED IN WASHINGTON ON VERY SHORT NOTICE JULY 13 TO MAKE URGENT PERSONAL APPEAL FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO STRENGTHEN CHAD'S ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THE REBEL SITUATION IN TIBESTI MOUNTAINS IN THE NORTHWEST.

B) THE CHAD GOVERNMENT HAS LOST EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THIS REGION TO TOUBOU REBELS, WHO HAVE RECEIVED ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF EQUIPMENT, TRAINING AND POSSIBLY TROOPS FROM LIBYA. LIBYAN TROOPS HAVE BEEN IN MILITARY OCCUPATION OF PART OF THE AREA, NOTABLY THE SETTLEMENT OF AOUZOU, SINCE 1973. THE LIBYAN OBJECTIVE APPEARS TO BE EITHER OUTRIGHT ACQUISITION OF THE AREA OR THE CREATION OF A SEMI-AUTONOMOUS STATE DEPENDENT ON LIBYA.

C) IN THE LATTER PART OF JUNE, REBEL FORCES INCREASED  
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THEIR ACTIVITIES AND CAPTURED THE SETTLEMENT OF BARDAI WITH 350 CHADIAN TROOPS AND THEIR EQUIPMENT. THIS WAS A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE CHAD ARMY. AS A RESULT, THE CHADIANS WITHDREW THEIR GARRISON AT ZOUAR, THUS RELINQUISHING CONTROL OF THE TIBESTI, AND STRENGTHENED THEIR DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AT LARGEAU AND OUNIANGA KEBIR.

D) THE CHAD VICE PRESIDENT INFORMS US THAT CHAD'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE NORTH OUTSIDE THE TIBESTI IS NOT CERTAIN. HE REQUESTED THE EQUIPMENT LISTED IN REF E, SAYING THIS WAS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ALLOW CHAD TO RESUME THE OFFENSIVE.

E) IN A MEETING JULY 15, VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE INFORMED DJIME WE WOULD ASSIST CHAD AND WOULD INFORM CHAD OF THE FORM THIS ASSISTANCE WOULD TAKE THROUGH OUR EMBASSY IN NDJAMENA.

F) WE ARE NOW EXAMINING THE VARIOUS WAYS IN WHICH WE MIGHT ASSIST CHAD. WE KNOW CHAD HAS REQUESTED HELP FROM OTHER GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING FRANCE, THE FRG AND BELGIUM. WE WOULD PREFER TO ACT IN A MULTILATERAL CONTEXT AND BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF PROVIDING THE ASSISTANCE CHAD URGENTLY NEEDS.

3. FOR PARIS - YOU SHOULD CONCLUDE THE FOREGOING POINTS BY SAYING THAT WE RECOGNIZE FRANCE HAS BEEN THE PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF ASSISTANCE TO CHAD, AND THAT WE WOULD SUPPORT

CONTINUED FRENCH LEADERSHIP. WE WOULD WELCOME FRENCH VIEWS ON THE BEST WAY TO COORDINATE THE ACTIONS OF CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS. IT HAD OCCURRED TO US, FOR INSTANCE, THAT THE GOF MIGHT CONVENE A MEETING IN PARIS OF THOSE CONCERNED ABOUT CHAD THAT COULD INCLUDE BOTH DEVELOPED EUROPEAN NATIONS, CONCERNED AFRICANS, AND POSSIBLY OTHERS SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA. SUCH A MEETING, HOWEVER, COULD ATTRACT PUBLICITY AND SOME INVITED GOVERNMENTS MIGHT BE CONFIDENTIAL

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RELUCTANT TO ATTEND. THUS, COORDINATED BILATERAL APPROACHES IN INTERESTED CAPITALS MIGHT BE PREFERABLE.

4. FOR BONN AND BRUSSELS - YOU SHOULD INCLUDE THE POINTS LISTED IN PARA 2 ABOVE, NOTE THAT FRANCE HAS BEEN THE PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF ASSISTANCE TO CHAD AND THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT A CONTINUED FRENCH LEAD IN THIS FIELD. WE WOULD WELCOME THE VIEWS OF THE GERMAN AND BELGIAN GOVERNMENTS REGARDING ASSISTANCE TO CHAD, AND THE BEST WAY TO COORDINATE THE EFFORTS OF CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS.

5. FOR INFO ADDRESSEES - INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO THESE GOVERNMENTS WILL FOLLOW WHEN WE KNOW FRENCH, GERMAN AND BELGIAN REACTION.

VANCE

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ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

66011

DRAFTED BY AF/W:JHLEWIS:LFS

APPROVED BY AF/W:TWSMITH

S/S-O:AWOTTO

-----071191 252053Z /64

O 251905Z JUL 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 167607

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 167607 ACTION PARIS BONN BRUSSELS  
INFO NDJAMENA TRIPOLI RABAT CAIRO KHARTOUM JIDDA AMMAN  
KINSHASA LIBREVILLE  
19 JUL 77

QUOTE

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VANCE. UNQUOTE

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
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**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
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**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
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**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
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**Reference:** A) STATE 116492, B) BONN 11765, C) BRUSSELS 8224, D) PARIS 20708, E) STATE 166037  
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**Review Content Flags:** ANOMALY  
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**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CHAD  
**TAGS:** MASS, PINS, CD, US  
**To:** PARIS BONN MULTIPLE  
**Type:** TE  
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**Review Markings:**  
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